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In this contribution, we analyse the pattern of the so-called PIP (Partnerships and 
Public Initiatives) that have been approved between 2000 and mid-2003 in the POE
1 
framework. In particular, we will evaluate the extent of decentralisation that this new 
instrument has generated in competitiveness policy. 
Partnership approaches are a relatively recent phenomenon, but partnerships have 
received widespread attention and support from economic and political agents, 
including policy makers at national, regional and local levels. In fact, the term “public-
private partnership” covers a wide range of concepts and practices. In our contribution, 
we will focus on partnerships in a competitiveness policy framework. 
In a first section, we discuss briefly the meaning and the extent of what we call 
competitiveness policy. Then, in a second section,  we focus our attention in public-
private partnerships as a specific instrument for policy. In particular, we make a first 
assessment on the distinctive principles that differentiate  public-private partnerships 
from more traditional instruments such as direct investment in public agencies or direct 
subventions to firms. We follow the perspective that these principles, mainly 
decentralization of policy, may contribute to a greater effectiveness of policy, because a 
more decentralised policy is supposed to increase focus and accountability and to 
involve agencies with specialized skills and a more narrow range of objectives. But, 
also, we will refer that some inefficiencies and some lack of equity may arise from the 
use of private-public partnerships instrument. 
Finally, in the main section of this contribution, we will analyse the above-
mentioned questions considering the case of the 131 PIP projects approved and financed 
by the POE between 2000 and mid-2003. As the major part of the variables used are 
nominal, and in order to define the decentralization pattern induced by this new 
instrument, we will use multivariate data analysis techniques in order to establish 
associations between several variables linked to decentralisation criteria and, also, to 
identify clusters of projects. 
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Competitiveness means the capability of economic unities (firms, territories, 
countries) for increasing their shares in global markets. So, competitiveness has to do, 
first of all, with firms of the tradable goods sectors: in order to be or remain 
competitive, firms that are submitted to international competition must increase their 
efficiency by improving their organization and by innovative activities. However, firms 
competitiveness relies on a set of factors that exceeds either the firm sphere or the 
tradable goods sectors. 
First, these factors include the conditions in primary input markets. An adequate 
provision of primary inputs that can be accumulated such as capital and equipments, 
human capital and knowledge, and efficient markets for these inputs, are usually 
considered as the main aspects of competitiveness and growth conditions. Neoclassical 
growth theory (Solow, 1956; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) or standard factorial and neo-
factorial theories of international trade are focused on this dimension of competitiveness 
factors. 
Second, competitiveness also relies on an adequate provision of public goods or 
services. The relevance of public goods for competitiveness and growth has been 
pointed out by pioneers such as Aschauer (1989) and justified by externalities generated 
by public investment in infrastructures. More recently, neoclassical authors also called 
the attention for the impact in growth of institutional and politic conditions, namely 
those that afford the respect for proprietary rights (Barro, 1991).  Krugman (1991) also 
stressed the importance of an adequate provision of public goods and its relation with 
the performance of the tradable goods sector. 
More distant from neoclassical perspectives, a set of relevant contributions focus 
on what we will call collective entrepreneurship. These last perspectives see 
entrepreneurial and institutional resources as a main factor of competitiveness and, at 
the same time, they consider the relevance of network relationships between firms and / 
or other related institutions. Networks and clusters are a source of positive externalities 
for firms, because they favour not only firms specialisation but also the access to 
specialized services and the reduction of transaction costs. In terms of dynamic 
efficiency, clusters and networks are also effective in uncertainty reduction and, in 
doing so, they favour innovation and diffusion. Although with quite different 
perspectives, we can find main references for the role of collective entrepreneurship in 
competitiveness in pioneers like Porter (1990; 1998) or Becattini (1979), the first one 
  2 with his “clusters” analysis and the second one proposing the “industrial district” as a 
major category for understanding competitiveness. 
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Figure 1 resumes this systemic vision of competitiveness factors, considering 
additionally that, with today’s increasing globalisation, competitiveness also implies 
firms’ capability for directly deal in global markets. 
If we accept this systemic vision, competitiveness policy will include a lot of 
things. For instance, conventional public investment in education, health or justice will 
also be part of competitiveness policy even if these actions are addressed to wider social 
objectives. The same can be argued about market regulation policies. However, in this 
contribution we will focus on interventions that are specifically directed to the 
promotion of collective entrepreneurship and we will identify these last actions with 
competitiveness policy in a more narrow sense. 
  3 The relevance of collective entrepreneurship and of entrepreneurial and 
institutional networks has to do with the need to overpass market failures. For instance, 
if knowledge was a typical private and tradable input, firms could simply buy it in the 
market. On the contrary, if knowledge were a typical public good, with an automatic 
diffusion, then conventional public intervention would be the main instrument to allow 
firms to access knowledge. But, as we know, a major part of knowledge has a tacit 
nature and its creation results from a cumulative process that cannot be dissociated from 
productive experience. That’s why clusters and networks favour the creation and 
diffusion of knowledge. 
Others examples of market failures can be found in international marketing 
services. If firms want to have a direct access to markets, to buy international marketing 
services can’t be the general solution because this is in conflict with the direct access 
objective. On the other hand, a global public intervention is restricted to some services 
that are typically public, like for instance the promotion of the external image of the 
country. So, in a great extent, an active international marketing policy must rely on 
firms efforts. However indivisibilities are often very important in this field and 
uncertainty is high; that’s why the best solution can rely on co-operative actions, 
involving several firms and specialised institutions. 
So, collective entrepreneurship can be seen as the carrying on of gap filling and 
input completing activities, these activities being central to entrepreneurship definition 
as Leibenstein (1966) pointed out. The collective nature is linked to the fact that these 
actions concern clusters of firms with similar productive interests and also public and 
semi-public agents like specialised agencies, local governments or entrepreneurial 
associations. 
 
2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTENERSHIPS 
Partnership approaches are a relatively recent phenomenon, but partnerships have 
received widespread attention and support from economic and political agents, 
including policy makers at national, regional and local levels. As Osborne (2000) 
pointed out, the 1990s has seen the establishment of public-private partnerships (PPP) 
as key tool of public policy. This quick diffusion of PPP instrument was supported by 
the idea that PPP are a cost-efficient and effective mechanism for the implementation of 
public policy across a range of policy agendas; but, following Osborne, PPP have also 
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terms of developing socially inclusive communities. 
OCDE (2001) also stresses a growing number of European experiences: networks 
of partnerships flourish in most parts of Europe, under the impetus of the European 
Union, whose funding programmes have both favoured projects agreed in partnerships 
and stimulated partnerships experimentation since the late-1990s. Experiences reported 
in OCDE (2001) cover partnerships aimed at improving social inclusion at regional or 
local level but also, and increasingly, PPP are assigned a broader role in “integrated” 
development. For instance, in Italy, partnerships are central to the participatory planning 
exercises conducted across different levels of government to design and implement 
more integrated and effective development policies.  
The case studied in next section concerns PPP in a competitiveness policy 
framework. In this case, PPP are mainly an instrument to implement what we call 
collective entrepreneurship. This means that PPP aim, in first hand, to assure the 
provision of relevant services to firms; these services (namely technological, 
commercial and information services) are crucial to improve firms competitiveness, but 
simple market mechanisms do not afford an adequate provision of them. 
This market failures view is an argument that justifies public intervention in 
general, either conventional interventions or partnerships. Market failures arise from the 
existence of externalities that generate a public or semi-public nature for some goods 
and services. So, without public intervention, the provision of these goods will be below  
the social optimal level. Market failures are also induced by the existence of co-
ordination malfunctions (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). These co-ordination failures 
mean that private investment decisions are interdependent. Co-ordination within a 
sector, for instance, may accelerate the growth of the sector and generate an earlier 
move towards lower long run costs, because co-ordination will allow the use of more 
specialised equipments and skills. 
In fact, specific arguments in favour of PPP are, in a great extent, associated to the 
idea that this instrument is particularly adequate to solve co-ordination failures, because 
partnerships correspond, by definition, to a collaborative effort between public agencies 
and several private agents, these last including private collective institutions such as 
entrepreneurial associations. 
So, in comparison with more traditional instruments such as direct funding of 
public agencies or direct subventions to individual firms, PPP rely on some distinctive 
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funding, (ii) subsidierity and decentralisation and (iii) institutional sustainability. We 
will discuss briefly these principles and the way in which they may contribute to a 
greater effectiveness of policy. 
PPP are an instrument based on a contractual relationship established between 
Government and a set of partners, in order to carrying on a specific project. This means 
that public funding is no more made on an annual budget basis but, on the contrary, 
funding is linked to a specific intervention and to a set of specific objectives. This 
contractual dimension confers to PPP an innovative character in public management and 
can improve efficiency in the use of public resources. McQuaid (2000) also considers 
the advantages of partnerships in resource availability, because partnerships are 
important mechanisms to achieve complementary, avoid wasteful duplication of effort 
and pooling resources so that larger projects, or more aspects of a project, can be 
tackled than is possible for an individual agency. 
In recent literature about partnerships, decentralisation is often seen as the major 
positive aspect induced by PPP, because a more decentralised policy is supposed to 
increase focus and accountability and to involve agencies with a more narrow range of 
objectives (McQuaid, 2000). In comparison with more conventional instruments, PPP 
will correspond to more targeted interventions; decentralisation will favour 
interventions designed for specific sectors and / or regions and conduced by institutions 
that are closer to the final recipients, i.e,, firms. So, decentralisation will favour 
specialisation and proximity and this will act for more effectiveness and efficiency. 
That’s why, as Carroll and Steane (2000) point out, the growth off PPP occur mainly at 
the local and regional, rather than national levels, though often initiated and funded by 
national governments. 
Finally, partnerships can also be seen as a process of building institutions and, in 
consequence, a factor that increases sustainability of policy actions. Partnerships favour 
the creation and consolidation of institutional and firms networks and a cumulative 
experience of these institutions in conducing policy actions. The result of this learning-
by-doing process must be considered an important specific asset that will be useful not 
only in present but also in future. We can apply to partnerships the concept of collective 
learning and the positive effects of this learning process in institutions capability to 
coordinate different skills and to integrate different technological trajectories (on this, 
see Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Foss and Knudsen, 1996). 
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also bring some new problems prejudicial to efficacy, efficiency and equity. First of all, 
policy decentralisation induced by PPP can act in favour of the more prepared to access 
this instrument. This means, for instance, that regions or sectors with a stronger 
institutional framework will be more able than others to propose partnerships projects. 
So partnerships will not favour equity and, in this case, we will have a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. 
Another main problem is directly linked to the relation between institutional 
specialisation and effectiveness (efficacy and efficiency). As McQuaid (2000) points 
out, an apparent paradox can exist in partnerships when the multifunctional nature of 
policies needed to deal with complex issues conflicts with the single-functional natures 
of the organizations. So, this potential conflict concerns “…the fragmentation of 
publicly funded agencies and the multifaceted nature of issues that government must 
deal with” (McQuaid, 2000, p. 10). As we will assess later, this conflict will have a 
greater relevance when policy objectives comprise structural change. 
 Finally, efficiency linked to PPP internal organization is still in an initial state of 
evaluation. More frequent problems can emerge from unclear goals, resource costs, 
unequal power, cliques usurping power, impacts upon other “mainstream” services or 
differences in philosophy between partners (McQuaid, 2000). OCDE (2001) compares 
PPP to a black box because inputs and outputs are visible, but the mechanisms enabling 
the transformation from input to output are not. In particular, the degree of utilisation of 
the various sources of funds, the distribution of responsibility in programme 
implementation, the role of the various local actors and the extent of institutional 
involvement are often unknown parameters. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the 
efficiency of partnerships, and to draw proper comparison with other governance 
instruments such as government services operating programmes within conventional 
public management frameworks. 
 
3. PUBLIC INITIATIVES AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PORTUGUESE 
COMPETITIVENESS POLICY 
The Portuguese experience concerning the use of PPP in the field of 
competitiveness policy is quite recent but also quite rich. This new instrument of policy 
has been tested, for the first time, between 1994 and 1999 in the PEDIP 2
2 framework 
and explicitly adopted and standardised in POE between 2000 and 2003.   
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3 led to the conclusion that the traditional instruments 
of competitiveness policy, namely direct funding of central public agencies and direct 
subventions to firms, were not enough to remove the factors hampering a faster 
modernisation of the Portuguese industries and a great increase of their competitiveness.  
To reach these objectives, it was needful to persuade enterprises to change their 
conduct concerning some critical field (e.g.: R&D, design, fashion, marketing, human 
capital, networks) and chiefly to promote their relations with associations and other 
institutions (e.g.: universities, technological agencies) concerned with the development 
of common strategies and projects. 
It was in this context that a more voluntarist kind of policy was created in the 
PEDIP 2 based on the idea of partnership. Later, in 2000, POE also developed a 
framework that supported public-private partnerships, by the creation of a new 
instrument called “Partnerships and Public Initiatives” (PIP). As the name indicates, PIP 
can contemplate two main types of projects distinguished primarily by the protagonist 
of its execution: (i) partnership projects that are proposed by one or several private  
non-profit institutions but are compulsorily developed in cooperation with one or more 
public agencies under the umbrella of the Ministry of Economy and (ii) public 
initiatives projects that are proposed and executed by public agencies with or without 
other institutions. 
Looking to the original version of POE, we find PIP in seven of the twelve 
measures that composed this programme, which attest the importance that was given to 
this instrument. The initial budget affected to PIP for the period 2000-2006 ascended to 
341,4 millions of Euros, representing 11,2% of the total POE budget. In the last version 
of the POE, this budget was reduced to 271,3 millions of Euros, representing 6,6% of 
the total POE budget.  
 
Universe of Projects and Available Data 
Our aim is to analyse the pattern of PIP that has been approved between 2000 and 
the 30th June of 2003 within the POE framework. The data was provided to us by 
Portuguese authorities
4, in the context of the POE middle-term evaluation, and concerns 
151 approved projects of that kind. These projects represent a total investment of 351,6 
millions of Euros and a public subvention of 268,4 millions of Euros. For our present 
evaluation purposes, the 151 projects have been consolidated in 131 because some of 
them were individualised only for administrative reasons as they referred either to 
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consecutive editions of the same action. 
Original variables available in the database concern aspects such as the nature of 
project (public initiative or partnership), the name and nature of promoters, the number 
of partners, the nature of the project in terms of its competitiveness dimension (i.e., 
entrepreneurship, technology, internationalisation, etc.), the investment and subvention 
amounts, the sector incidence, the spatial incidence (national, regional, local) and some 
others. It also contains some qualitative information (such as the name and description 
of the project) that helped to codify variables on several categories. The table presented 
in Appendix A provides the summary of the variables available that were taken in to 
account, their nature and the way they were codified. 
 
Defining Clusters of Projects: Statistical Data Analysis Methodology 
In order to identify possible patterns of policy decentralisation that arise from the 
use of PIP as a policy instrument, our approach is based on the identification of clusters 
of projects. For this purpose, we begin by considering an ab initio typology defined by 
crossing variables concerning project type (public initiatives or partnerships) and the 
nature of promoters. 
This previous typology allows us to classify the 131 projects in 6 categories in 
respect to promoter type: one is coincident with the set of public initiatives (because in 
this case it is mandatory for the first promoter to be a public agency or administration); 
the other five correspond to partnerships promoted, respectively, by entrepreneurial 
associations, technological agencies or universities, public agencies or central 
administration, other private associations and, finally, formal networks of firms. 
The other three variables used to identify clusters are related to the degree and 
dimension of decentralisation: the number of partners, the sectoral incidence (including 
the possibility of multisectoral projects) and the regional incidence (including the 
possibility of non-regionalized projects). 
Table 1 presents the distribution of projects by categories of the set of variables 
under analysis. Considering the type of projects, we find a notable dominance of 
partnerships promoted by entrepreneurial associations and of public initiatives. In 
relation to the number of partners, it is evident the preponderance of projects with two 
partners. By sector of incidence, it is visible that the majority of projects was directed to 
the industry or are multisectoral. Finally, in terms of regional incidence, we identified 
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region) and non-regionalized projects. 
 
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION FREQUENCY OF OBJECTS BY SET OF VARIABLES 
  Marginal Frequency 
Variables Number  Percentage 
Type of Project       
   1- P-EA  65  49,6% 
   2- P-TA&U  10  7,6% 
   3- P-PA&CA  5  3,8% 
   4- P-PRIVA  13  9,9% 
   5- P-CEA  1  0,8% 
   6- IP  37  28,2% 
Number of Partners       
   1- 1P  31  23,7% 
   2- 2P  78  59,5% 
   3- 3P  16  12,2% 
   4- 4P  3  2,3% 
   5- 5P  1  0,8% 
  6- 6P  2  1,5% 
Sector of Incidence       
   1- COM  10  7,6% 
   2- CONST  2  1,5% 
   3- ENERG  5  3,8% 
   4- MANUF  64  48,9% 
   5- MULTS  35  26,7% 
   6- SERV  1  0,8% 
  7- TUR  14  10,7% 
Regional Incidence       
   1- REG  68  51,9% 
  2- NREG  63  48,1% 
 
The data analysis for clusters identification proceeds in two steps. In the first one, 
HOMALS (Homogeneity analysis by means of alternating least squares) is applied to 
identify and describe the pattern of the PIP that has been approved between 2000 and 
the middle-2003. In the second step, cluster analysis is used to validate the HOMALS 
results and to define groups of PIP considering characteristics regarding the four 
variables previously defined. 
The choice of HOMALS as the statistical technique to analyse the pattern of PIP is 
justified by the fact that the main part of information about the projects approved in the 
context of PIP had qualitative/categorical nature. In fact, two multivariate data analysis 
techniques are available to understand and describe simultaneously the structure of 
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conclude about this interrelated categories: the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and 
the HOMALS. Nevertheless the differences in the mathematical procedures supporting 
these techniques, they produce similar geometrical displays and, therefore, permit 
analogous conclusions regarding the data interpretation (Carvalho, 2000). 
HOMALS may be described as a relatively free-method. It is basically an 
exploratory and descriptive technique, developed by American researchers of the 
University of Leiden in the early years of the 1990s, which uncovers and describes the 
associations between the categories of a set of nominal variables or variables treated as 
such (Geer, 1993). A fundamental characteristic of HOMALS is that it allows to present 
the results geometrically (as points within a low-dimensional space denominated 
perceptual map), which facilitates data interpretation. The relative position of the 
categories in the space translates the nature of relations among them. Therefore, 
categories with similar distributions will be represented as points that are close in the 
space and this means that they are associated and vice-versa. As a result, objects with 
similar profiles will be located close in the space and, thus, defining homogeneous 
groups (Carvalho, 2001). 
For our empirical analysis, we decide to restrict the application of HOMALS to 
only two dimensions of analysis. We advance two reasons to justify this choice. First, 
the eigenvalues that we obtain from this technique drop down very quickly when we 
pass from one to two and three dimensions. Second, low-dimensional representations  
are easier to visualize. 
 
TABLE 2:DISCRIMINATING MEASURES 
  Dimension 
Variables  Dim 1  Dim 2 
Type of Projects  0,8551  0,7348 
Number of Partners  0,8056  0,4820 
Sector of Incidence  0,4946  0,2426 
Regional Incidence  0,2948  0,0112 
Eigenvalues  0,6125 0,3677 
 
Table 2 presents the discriminating measures for the two dimensions under 
analysis and the correspondent eigenvalues. As we can see, dimension 1 discriminates 
the project type and the number of partners from the sector and the regional incidence of 




FIGURE 2: PERCEPTUAL MAP FOR CATEGORIES OF PIP VARIABLES 
 
Figure 2 presents the perceptual map produced by HOMALS (via SPSS, version 
12.0) when applied to the 131 PIP approved between 2000 and mid-2003. This map 
shows the level of associations between the various categories of these projects. In a 
preliminary analysis, we identify two large clouds of projects. One of them incorporates 
public initiatives with only one partner (the promoter), mainly non-regionalized and 
with incidence in tourism and commerce sectors or with multisectoral incidence. The 
other includes mostly partnerships promoted by entrepreneurial associations and private 
agencies, with only two partners, directed at manufacturing, construction and service 
sectors and largely regionalized. Obviously, there are some categories distant from these 
  12 two clouds (e.g.: partnerships promoted by networks of complementary firms, projects 
with incidence in energy sector, projects promoted by technological agencies or 
universities) that eventually suggest the existence of other clouds of projects. 
Whatever the sub-configurations spanned by the core dimensions of the HOMALS 
perceptual map represent theoretically consistent groups, it is recommended 
nevertheless to confirm their definition through the application of a classification 
method such as cluster analysis. Moreover, the complementary use of both multivariate 
data analysis tools is justified because HOMALS suggests the existence of some groups 
in the data but doesn't enable to operate with them (Carvalho, 1998). 
 






  Cluster Centers  C 
 
The application of cluster analysis will generate a new categorical variable 
indicating the final cluster membership of each object. In this sense, it is possible to 
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and to obtain a better understanding of the data structure.  
Since the purpose is to validate the HOMALS solution regarding the existence of 
a few groups and to characterise these groups, we proceed by applying a cluster analysis 
using the k-means cluster optimisation method (Hair et al., 1995). Specifically, we 
produce the grouping of PIP in two steps. First, we use the hierarchical grouping 
method of Ward (1963). And, in fact, the analysis of the calculated fusion coefficient 
suggests the existence of not two but five groups or clusters of PIP projects. Second, we 
use the non-hierarchical grouping k-means method to define the composition of the five 
clusters suggested. 
Figure 3 exhibits the perceptual map provided by HOMALS and the position of 
the five identified clusters illustrated by the centroids C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5. 
 
Clusters and Decentralisation Pattern 
Table 3 presents the frequency distribution of the four original variables in the five 
clusters solution and confirms that this cluster solution is helpful to characterise the 
policy decentralisation pattern generated by the use of PIP instrument in alternative to 
the conventional intervention of central government. 
Clusters C1 and C3 are composed by public initiatives projects. In these clusters, 
projects have almost always only one partner (i.e., the promoter). In fact, C1 
corresponds to 3 public initiatives addressed to energy sector, two of them promoted by 
DGE (Directorate-General for Energy) and the other by INETI (a public technological 
agency for industry). In C3, the 32 public initiatives concerns a more large spectrum of 
economic sectors (commerce, tourism, manufacturing) or are multisectoral; in this 
cluster, ICEP (a public central agency for promotion of foreign trade and 
internationalisation) is the promoter in 18 cases and IAPMEI (a public central agency 
for support to investment and to small business) is the promoter in 7 cases. 
Clusters 2, 4 and 5 concern, with a few exceptions, partnerships. C2 is the largest 
cluster, with 66 projects, and it is characterized by the fact that the promoters are mainly 
private entrepreneurial associations. In 21 cases, these associations have a sectoral 
nature and in 10 cases a regional / local nature. The number of partners is two, in all 
cases, and reflects a pattern that associates the private promoter with a public central 
agency, like IAPMEI or ICEP, as a second partner. In this cluster, projects are 
addressed largely to manufacturing or have a multisectoral nature. 
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TABLE 3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ORIGINAL VARIABLES IN A FIVE CLUSTERS 
SOLUTION 
   Clusters 
Variables  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3  Cluster C4  Cluster C5 
Type of Project                
   1- P-EA  0,0%  75,8%  0,0% 9,1%  73,7% 
   2- P-TA&U  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  90,9%  0,0% 
   3- P-PA&CA  0,0%  4,5%  0,0%  0,0%  10,5% 
   4- P-PRIVA  0,0%  16,7%  0,0%  0,0%  10,5% 
   5- P-NCF  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,3% 
   6- IP  100,0%  3,0%  100,0%  0,0% 0,0% 
Number of Partners                
   1- 1P  100,0%  0,0%  87,5%  0,0% 0,0% 
   2- 2P  0,0%  100,0%  12,5%  72,7%  0,0% 
   3- 3P  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  84,2% 
   4- 4P  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  27,3%  0,0% 
   5- 5P  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,3% 
   6- 6P  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,5% 
Sector of Incidence                
   1- COM  0,0%  4,5%  18,8%  0,0%  5,3% 
   2- CONST  0,0%  3,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0% 
   3- ENERG  100,0%  0,0% 0,0%  18,2%  0,0% 
   4- MANUF  0,0%  54,5%  21,9%  54,5% 78,9% 
   5- MULTS  0,0%  31,8%  25,0%  27,3%  15,8% 
   6- SERV  0,0%  1,5%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0% 
   7- TUR  0,0%  4,5%  34,4%  0,0% 0,0% 
Regional Incidence                
   1- REG  33,3%  59,1%  21,9%  72,7% 68,4% 
   2- NREG  66,7%  40,9%  78,1%  27,3% 31,6% 
Number of Projects  3  66  32  11  19 
% of Total  2,3%  50,4%  24,4%  8,4%  14,5% 
 
 
  Cluster 4 includes 11 partnerships with 2 or 4 partners and with a sectoral 
incidence that follows the pattern of C2 (although also includes some projects in 
energy). The main characteristic that discriminates C4 from C2 concerns the nature of 
the promoter: C4 projects (with a single exception) are lead by technological agencies 
(private agencies in 6 cases) or universities. 
  Finally, Cluster 5 is composed by 19 partnerships similar to those of C2 in terms 
of the nature of the promoter and also largely focused in manufacturing or, with less 
relevance, multisectoral. What discriminates C5 from C2 projects is mainly the number 
of partners: in C5 we have partnerships with 3 to 6 partners. 
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regionalized (i.e., projects that concerns a specific region) and non-regionalized projects 
(68 e 63 projects, respectively). But there is a clear association between regional 
incidence and the type of projects (Pearson Chi-Square test presents a p-value of 0,000): 
public initiatives are mainly non-regionalized and 63% of partnerships correspond to 
regionalized projects. Regional decentralisation in partnerships would appear even 
greater if we consider the characteristics of the non-regionalized projects that concerns 
manufacturing: a part of them have a sub sectoral incidence and are promoted by 
national sectoral associations, but they concern industries that are largely regional or 
local clusters. 
Note that the two main decentralisation criteria (sectorial and regional 
decentralisation) show some degree of association (Pearson chi-square test applied to 
the variables considered in table 4 presents a p-value of 0,017). PIP in manufacturing 
represent 49% of the global number of projects and they correspond to the sectoral 
category that is more regionalized. On the contrary, multisectoral projects presents also 
a less decentralised pattern in terms of regional incidence. The other economic sectors 
are much less represented, showing a weak access to PIP instrument. For tourism, 
energy, construction and services sectors, PIP projects have mainly a national non-
regionalized incidence. Projects concerning commerce follow an equitative distribution 
between regionalized and non-regionalized projects. 
 
TABLE 4:NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY SECTOR AND REGIONAL DECENTRALISATION 
  Commerce Construction Energy Manuf Services Tourism Multisector PIP 
Regionalized 5  0 1  43  0  4 15  68 
Non-
regionalized  5 2  4  21  1  10  20  63 
PIP 10  2  5  64  1  14  35  131 
 
These elements show clearly that a greater decentralisation is linked to 
partnerships. In fact, public initiatives are closer to the conventional pattern of public 
intervention because they typically involve one single public agency such as ICEP or 
IAPMEI. Also, public initiatives are more often addressed to national non-regionalized 
interventions. This means that public initiatives follows more a principle of contractual 
funding within central public administration, as they correspond to a model in which the 
funding of public agencies is based on contracts addressed to specific interventions 
instead of global budget transfers. 
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they include, with a greater frequency, projects addressed to specific sectors and to 
specific regions. The 43 projects that are simultaneously regionalized and addressed to 
manufacturing are quite representative of this decentralisation pattern. They represent 
33% of the total of projects and a global investment of 158,4 millions of Euros (45% of 
total investment); also, in 32 cases, they are addressed not to manufacturing as a whole 
but to specific sub sectors. 
As argued before, policy decentralisation induced by instruments like PIP can 
improve the effectiveness of policy, because interventions will be more focused in 
specific targets (sectors, regions, competitiveness dimensions) and will be conducted by 
more specialised agencies. An increase in effectiveness will also arise by the fact that 
decentralised policies will allow the accumulation of experience in institutions that are 
closer to firms, like entrepreneurial associations, and this will contribute to greater 
sustainability of policy impacts. We will try to assess some specific aspects concerning 
these questions. 
 
Effectiveness and Specialisation 
It is quite clear that decentralization as favored specialization. As analyzed in 
precedent paragraph, projects in clusters C2, C4 and C5 are mainly focused in specific 
sectors and / or in specific regions, being conducted by private agencies that have 
mainly a sectoral or regional nature. This pattern has concerned mainly the 
manufacturing sector.  
Considering all the set of 131 projects, manufacturing is by large the economic 
sector more represented, since 64 projects are specific oriented to it. In terms of sectoral 
incidence, the second more frequent category corresponds to multisectoral projects (35 
cases); the other economic sectors present a small number of projects: tourism (14), 
commerce (10), energy (5), construction (2) and services (1). 
Note that POE/PRIME has a potential incidence in almost all non infrastructure 
economic sectors, excluding agriculture and fisheries, financial activities and some 
segments of transports. But the access to PIP instrument by target sectors of the 
programme other than manufacturing is very weak. This can be partially explained by 
the fact that in official precedent programmes (PEDIP 1 and PEDIP 2) manufacturing 
was the only eligible sector and these pasted experiences had conferred to industrial 
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extended capability to take advantage of public programmes. 
Specialisation will be also reflected by the distribution of projects in terms of POE 
measures and competitiveness dimensions. In POE architecture, we find PIP instrument 
available in seven of the twelve total measures that have been defined. However, as two 
of them do not have been regulated, the 131 PIP approved are focused only in five 
measures: Measure 2.1 - Supporting products and activities with strategic dimension, 
Measure 2.2 - Mobilising new  ideas and new entrepreneurs, Measure 2.4 - Promoting 
new spaces of economic development, Measure 3.3 - Supporting associations and the 
entrepreneurial information and Measure 3.5 - Promoting the country and the 
internationalisation of the economy. 
Table 5 exhibits the distribution of PIP by cluster and POE measure. 
Internationalisation (measure 3.5) corresponds to the main area of intervention and 
observation (measure 3.3) to the second. The first of PI clusters, C1, is totally integrated 
in measure 2.1. The other, C3 cluster, is largely concentrated in measure 3.5 and 3.3, 
replicating the general pattern. 
In partnerships, the largest cluster also repeated the general pattern. It also 
represents the more diversified cluster in terms of measures, with incidence in all of 
them. Unlikely, cluster C4 is focused in measure 2.1 and 2.2. Finally, cluster C5 is 
largely identical to C2, but also characterised by projects that integrate more than one 
measure. 
 
TABLE 5: NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY CLUSTER AND POE MEASURE 
  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3  Cluster C4  Cluster C5  PIP 
Measure  2.1  3 8 6 5 1  23 
Measure  2.2  0 7 1 5 2  15 
Measure  2.4  0 1 0 0 1  2 
Measure  3.3  0  19 8 0 5  32 
Measure 3.5  0  29  17  1  6  53 
Measures 3.3 and 3.5  0  1  0  0  2  3 
Measures 2.1 and 3.5  0  1  0  0  1  2 
Measures 2.1 and 2.2  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Total  3 66 32 11 19  131 
 
However, one of the more impressive facts is the residual relevance of PIP 
projects that integrate more than one measure. In public initiatives this was a expected 
result, because those initiatives tend to be promoted by central but specialised public 
  18 agencies (for instance, projects promoted by ICEP will normally be in measure 3.5, 
dedicated to internationalisation). On the contrary, in the case of partnerships projects 
and, namely, in sectoral or regionalized projects of that kind, it could be advantageous  
that specific sectoral or regional projects would involve a local integration of measures 
and dimensions. 
 
TABLE 6: NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY CLUSTER AND POE DIMENSION 
  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3  Cluster C4  Cluster C5  PIP 
ENERE 3  0  0  1  0  4 
AMB 0  3  0  0  0  3 
GPRAT 0  1  0  0  0  1 
ECOM 0  1  0  0  0  1 
COOP 0  1  0  0  0  1 
INOV 0  2  0  0  0  2 
HUMR 0  1  0  0  0  1 
ISYST 0  1  0  0  0  1 
IT 0  2  0  0  0  2 
ENT 0  7  0  3  2  12 
INT 0  30  17  1  6  54 
OBS 0  10  9  2  4  25 
RCS 0  0  0  0  1  1 
H&S 0  0  1  0  0  1 
EXCP 0  1  4  3  1  9 
INDP 0  0  1  1  0  2 
MULTA 0  6  0  0  5  11 
Total 3  66  32  11  19  131 
 
The distribution of PIP projects by cluster and POE dimension confirms the 
pattern in terms of measures. Considering all the set of 131 projects, we observe that 
internationalisation (INT) clearly represents the main dimension of interventions with 
more than 40% of all PIP. This pattern results from the fact that POE totally centralised 
the promotion of internationalisation in the instrument PIP, single firms having no 
access to measures related to internationalisation. Observation (OBS) and 
entrepreneurship (ENT) projects also have substantial importance as dimensions of 
intervention. Once again, projects that present an integrated or multidimensional nature 
(MULTA) are in a small number and only appear in C2 and C5 clusters. 
Moreover, Table 6 shows a robust association between the POE dimension and 
clusters confirmed by chi-square tests (Pearson test presents a p-value of 0,000). Cluster 
C1, which corresponds to one of the two PI clusters, is totally addressed to energetic 
efficiency. The other PI cluster, C3 cluster, is representative of the general pattern: it is 
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products.  
In partnerships clusters, the largest cluster (cluster C2) obviously replicates the 
general pattern. But, additionally, it is the more diversified cluster, with incidence in 13 
of the 17 dimensions. Differently, cluster C4 is focused in entrepreneurship and in the 
supply of excellence products dimensions. Finally, cluster C5 is largely similar to C2, 
but characterised by a smaller diversification of dimensions and by a great proportion of 
multidimensional projects. 
 
Decentralisation, Scale and Coordination  
 Although decentralisation can improve effectiveness (i.e. efficiency and 
efficacy) of policy, some inefficiency may occur if decentralisation leads to a 
fragmentation of interventions and to a overflow of projects concerning the same 
targets, with risk of duplication. However, if central coordination of the policy 
programme operates, these inefficiencies can be avoided.  
 
TABLE 7: NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY CLUSTERS AND INVESTMENT AMOUNT 
  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3  Cluster C4  Cluster C5  PIP 
INV1  1 36 9  5  3  54 
INV2  2 13 8  2  8  33 
INV3  0 10 8  2  4  24 
INV4  0 7 7 2  4  20 
Average INV (1.000 Euros)  988,8  2.065,4  3.212,9  2.475,5  4.328,3  2.683,7 
 
In our case study, data suggests that decentralisation has not led to excessive 
fragmentation. Table 7 shows that there is no relevant association between the 
distribution of the projects by cluster and by investment amount (Pearson chi-square 
test, p-value = 0,149) and even less when one compares investment amounts of public 
initiatives and partnerships. In fact, partnerships of C2 present a lower average 
investment amount than the typical public initiatives of C3; also in C2, projects of INV1 
class (less than 1.000.000 Euros) are over represented (55% of C2 projects against 41% 
of PIP projects). But, partnerships included in C5 presents the higher average for 
investment amount and, in this cluster, INV3 (between 2.500.000 and 5.000.000 Euros) 
and INV4 (more than 5.000.000 Euro) class are over represented. 
This means that selectivity criteria and central coordination have operated in order 
avoid an excessive large number of small interventions. Additionally, there is no 
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relevant association between clusters and levels of public subvention rate. Although 
public initiatives tend to have higher subvention rates than partnerships, the relative 
weight of public subventions is quite high for every cluster. 
 
TABLE 8: NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY CLUSTERS AND PUBLIC SUBVENTION RATE 
  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3 Cluster  C4 Cluster  C5  PIP 
R1 
(0% ≤ PSRATE < 50%) 
0 3 2 0 0  5 
R2 
(50% ≤ PSRATE < 70%) 
0 24 6  2  2  34 
R3 
(70% ≤ PSRATE < 90%) 
1 20 7  4 12  44 
R4 
(90% ≤ PSRATE < 100%) 
2 19  17 5  5  48 
Average PSRATE (%)  83 73 82 80 75  76 
 
Decentralisation and Structural Change Objectives 
One aspect that can reduce effectiveness of more decentralised policies is linked to 
the lack of strategic interventions directed to structural change, as decentralised policies 
can favour the present more representative sectors in the access to public support. To 
analyse this question we have proceed to a more detailed classification of projects 
concerning manufacturing: 21 of these 64 projects have a general incidence in 
manufacturing and were grouped in a category called MANUF4 but the other 43 
projects correspond to specific interventions in a large spectrum of sub sectors.  
 
TABLE 9: NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN MANUFACTURING BY SUB SECTOR AND CLUSTER 
  Cluster C1  Cluster C2  Cluster C3 Cluster  C4 Cluster  C5  PIP 
MANUF1  0 18 2  0  9 29 
MANUF2  0 3 1 3 3  10 
MANUF3  0 2 0 0 2 4 
MANUF4  0 13 4  3  1 21 
MANUF  0 36 7  6 15  64 
 
Grouping these sub sectors in 3 sets, we count 29, 10 and 4 projects respectively 
in MANUF1, MANUF2 and MANUF3. MANUF1 includes low-tech traditional sectors 
(namely food products and beverages, footwear, textiles and wearing apparel, furniture) 
corresponding largely to what Pavitt (1984) classifies as supplier dominated sectors. In 
MANUF2 we have grouped projects in sectors like motor vehicles and other transport equipment, machinery and equipment, metal products and specific metal products like 
moulds. Finally, the 4 projects grouped in MANUF3 concern industries based on 
natural resources (namely, construction materials, glass products and manufacture of 
wood and cork products). 
Table 9 shows some degree of association between the sub sectoral distribution of 
manufacturing projects and clusters, confirmed by chi-square tests (Pearson test 
presents a p-value of 0,047). Manufacturing projects of C2 (partnerships mainly 
promoted by entrepreneurial associations) are largely focused in traditional sectors 
while in C3 (typical public initiatives) projects are mainly associated to manufacturing 
as a whole. In C4 (partnerships promoted by technological agencies) projects in 
manufacturing are associated to this activity as a whole or to more technology-intensive 
sub sectors. Finally, manufacturing projects in C5 are almost all sub sectorial, including 
all kind of sub sectors. 
Since specific sub sectoral projects in manufacturing are mainly designed and 
promoted by entrepreneurial associations, their targets tend either to follow the same 
pattern of the present industrial structure (namely when promoters are sub sectoral 
associations) or to have a general no specific incidence in manufacturing (namely when 
promoters are universal entrepreneurial associations). On the contrary, when promoters 
and partners are technological agencies and/or universities (P-TA&U), technology 
intensive sectors are better represented. However, this last kind of promoter has a 
marginal presence in PIP projects. 
 
TABLE 10: NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN MANUFACTURING BY SUBSECTOR AND PROJECT TYPE 
 P-EA  P-TA&U  P-PA&CA  P-PRIVA  P-NCF  PI  PIP 
MANUF1  21  0 1 5 0 2  29 
MANUF2  6 3 0 0 0 1  10 
MANUF3  3 0 0 0 1 0 4 
MANUF4  13  3 0 0 0 5  21 
MANUF  43  6 1 5 1 8  64 
 
This is a major conclusion because it suggests a kind of trade-off between policy 
decentralisation and structural change goals. Although this trade-off could be 
counterbalanced by a greater voluntarism in public initiatives, data shows that only one 
project of public initiatives addressed to manufacturing have a specific incidence in 
MANUF2. 
 
  22 Decentralisation and Regional Access 
One last specific aspect is linked to the relation between decentralisation and 
regional access or regional equity. As we noticed before, 68 of the 131 PIP projects 
have an infra-national incidence. These regionalized projects could have, a priori, a 
regional or a local incidence. 
Portugal is divided in 7 regions (NUT 2 level) and in 30 sub-regions (NUT 3 
level). Note that all the 68 projects that have a specific regional incidence are all 
regionalized at NUT 3 level. This means that the pattern of regional incidence of PIP 
reflects either the relevance of national interventions (63 non-regionalized projects) or 
the relevance of local sub-regional actors. 
 





























































































































































































Investment 41,3  20,6  10,4  7,8 6,4 3,4 2,8 2,5 2,3 1,4 0,6 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 
Number of 
Projects  34,3  25,7  2,9 2,9 8,6 4,3 1,4 5,7 2,9 2,9 2,9 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,0 
 
Table 11 show a extremely unequal access of local economies to PIP instrument. 
In fact, 15 of the 30 NUT 3 don’t have any project with a specific incidence in their 
economies. The other 15 NUT 3 correspond, with a very few exceptions as Madeira, 
Algarve and Cova da Beira, to the more industrialized areas of Portugal, following the 
littoral string that goes from Braga (Cávado) to Setúbal (Península de Setúbal). 
But even inside this last group, access to PIP is largely concentrated in the two 
main and more developed areas of Great Oporto and Great Lisbon. These two areas 
represent almost 62% of total investment linked to regionalized PIP. Other 3 local 
economies (Pinhal Litoral, Entre Douro e Vouga and Cávado) show also a very good 
access to PIP instrument, especially if we compare their share in investment with their 
demographic or economic weight. 
In Pinhal Litoral (Centre Region) this is due to a few number of projects promoted 
by local entrepreneurial institutions and linked to strong local industrial clusters in 
Marinha Grande, concerning glass products and cristaliry, and moulds. The access of 
Entre Douro e Vouga (an area that confines with south limit of Great Oporto) is 
explained by two big projects concerning respectively cork industry and car 
  23 components, these activities corresponding to local clusters. Note that in Entre Douro e 
Vouga is also located the main Portuguese cluster in footwear and leather products and 
that the access to PIP of this last sector has been also quite high, although PIP projects 
in footwear – promoted by national sectoral association – were classified as non-
regionalized projects. Finally, the good access of Cávado is due to projects promoted by 
AIM (Minho Industrial Association), based in Braga, which is a sub regional dynamic 
entrepreneurial association. 
Obviously, policy decentralisation in terms of regional dimension leads to a 
competitive behaviour between regional institutions and favours the more developed 
and industrialized areas. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Public-private partnerships are a relatively recent instrument for social and 
economic development policies. The quick diffusion of this instrument, namely in 
OCDE and EU countries, is being supported by the idea that PPP can increase 
effectiveness (i.e., efficacity and efficiency) of economic policy. 
In particular, if we consider the use of PPP in the competitiveness policy 
framework, partnerships can be seen as an adequate way to reinforce collective 
entrepreneurship. This means that PPP are addressed to overpass market failures and, in 
particular, co-ordination failures. In doing so, partnerships will have a great impact on 
firms competitiveness, because they will act in favour of an adequate provision of 
advanced services and of collaborative efforts between public agencies and several 
private agents. In addition to these characteristics (solving market failures and 
promoting strategic co-ordination), PPP present some others specific principles. Above 
all, partnerships correspond to a more decentralised way of conducing policy, which 
favours more targeted interventions. PPP also represent an alternative way of public 
funding, based on a contractual relationship. Finally, PPP can improve sustainability of 
policy actions, because they reinforce a decentralised institutional framework. 
However, the evaluation of PPP benefits and malfunctions is still in its beginnings. 
That’s why our contribution was dedicated to evaluate the pattern of the so-called PIP 
(Partnerships and Public Initiatives) that have been approved between 2000 and mid-
2003 in the Portuguese POE framework 
  24 The main conclusion take from our case study is that partnerships really 
correspond to a more decentralised pattern for competitiveness policy and that this 
decentralisation can include institutional, sectoral and spatial dimensions.  
By using HOMALS and K-means cluster analysis, we were able to characterise 
the decentralisation pattern and to identify five typical clusters for the 131 PIP projects. 
Clusters 1 and 3 are composed by public initiatives projects with almost always only 
one partner. Clusters 2, 4 and 5 concerns, with a few exceptions, to partnerships with 
two or more partners. C2 is the largest cluster and it is characterized by the fact that the 
promoters are mainly entrepreneurial associations. 
The results have shown clearly that a greater decentralisation is linked to 
partnerships. In fact, public initiatives are closer to the conventional pattern of public 
intervention because they typically involve one single public agency. Also, public 
initiatives are more often addressed to national non-regionalized interventions. This 
means that public initiatives follows more a principle of contractual funding within 
central public administration, as they correspond to a model in which the funding of 
public agencies is based on contracts addressed to specific interventions instead of 
global budget transfers. 
On the contrary, partnerships are mainly promoted by private associations and 
they include, with a greater frequency, projects addressed to specific sectors and to 
specific regions. The 43 projects that are simultaneously regionalized and addressed to 
manufacturing are quite representative of this decentralisation pattern. They represent 
33% of the total of projects and a global investment of 158,4 millions of Euros (45% of 
total investment); also, in 32 cases, they are addressed not to manufacturing as a whole 
but to specific sub sectors. 
The identified pattern also show that decentralization has favored specialization. 
Projects in clusters C2, C4 and C5 are mainly focused in specific sectors and / or in 
specific regions, being conducted by private agencies that have chiefly a sectoral or 
regional nature. In parallel, the distribution of projects in terms of POE measures and 
competitiveness dimensions also reveled a great specialization.  
Consequently, we think that the decentralization induced by PIP exhibit a pattern 
that clearly promoted effectiveness of policy by interventions more focused in specific 
targets conducted by more specialized agencies. 
However, our analysis also have tried to evaluate some aspects induced by 
decentralization that can affect policy efficiency and equity. First, decentralization can 
  25 lead to a fragmentation of interventions and to a overflow of projects concerning the 
same targets, with risk of duplication. On this, we have conclude that central 
coordination have operated in order to avoid these risks. 
A second relevant question is linked to dynamic efficiency and structural change 
objectives. We have detected a pattern in which decentralization and institutional 
specialization have originated a bias towards the present more representative sectors 
(particularly within manufacturing) and to single dimensional projects. So, we have 
observed a kind of trade-off between policy decentralization and structural change 
goals, because these last objectives should be supported by projects addressed to 
emergent industries and with a multidimensional nature. 
One last specific aspect that we analyzed is linked to the relation between 
decentralization and comparative regional access or regional equity. Data on this 
question show a extremely unequal access of local economies to the PIP instrument. In 
fact, PIP projects are largely concentrated in the two main and more developed areas of 
the country: Great Oporto and Great Lisbon. 
These findings suggest that policy decentralization induced by partnerships, 
although desirable, should be accompanied by a more effective central coordination and 

















  26 APPENDIX A 
ORIGINAL VARIABLES AND CODIFIED VARIABLES 
Original Variables  Codified Variables 
Variable Nature  Variable  Categories  Nature 




1- EA (Entrepreneurial Association) 
2- TA&U (Technological Agency or University) 
3- PA&CA (Public Agency or Central Administration) 
4- PRIVA (Private Agency) 
5- NCF (Network of Complementary Firms) 
Nominal 
Partner 2 Name 
(idem for Partner 3, 4, …) 
Nominal PART2 
Partner 2 Type 
(idem for Partner 3, 4, …) 
1- EA (Entrepreneurial Association) 
2- TA&U (Technological Agency or University) 
3- PA&CA (Public Agency or Central Administration) 
4- PRIVA (Private Agency) 
5- NCF (Network of Complementary Firms) 
Nominal 
Project Type  Nominal  PROJT  
Project Type 
1- PI (Public Initiative) 
2- PAR (Partnership) 
Nominal 
Number of Partners  Numeric  NPAR 
Number of Partners 
1- 1P (One Partner) 
2- 2P (Two Partners 
3- 3P (Three Partners) 
4- 4P (Four Partners) 
5- 5P (Five Partners) 
6- 6P (Six Partners) 
Ordinal 
Sector of Incidence  Nominal  SINC 
Sector of Incidence 
1- COM (Commerce) 
2- CONST (Construction) 
3- ENERG (Energy) 
4- MANUF (Manufacturing) 
5- MULTS (Multisectorial) 
6- SERV (Services) 
7- TUR (Turisme) 
Nominal 
Regional Incidence  
(NUT II level) 
Nominal RINC 
Regional Incidence  
1- REG (Regionalized Project) 
2- NREG (Non Regionalized Project) 
Nominal 
Regional Incidence  
(NUT III level) 
Nominal  RINCIII 
Regional Incidence III 
(*) 
1- ALG (Algarve) 
2- AVE (Ave) 
3- BMOND (Baixo Mondego) 
4- BVOUGA (Baixo Vouga) 
5- CAV (Cávado) 
6- CBEIRA (Cova da Beira) 
7- DOUVO (Entre Douro e Vouga) 
8- LAF (Dão Lafões) 
9- LISB (Grande Lisboa) 
10- RAMAD (Região Autónoma da Madeira) 
11- NREG (Non Regionalized Project) 
12- OESTE (Oeste) 
13- PLITOR (Pinhal Litoral) 
14- PORTO (Grande Porto) 
15- SET (Península de Setúbal) 
16- TAM (Tâmega) 
(categories include all the NUT III that are reported to have 
PIP projects) 
Nominal 
(*) the set of projects regionalized at NUT II level is coincident with the set of projects regionalized at NUT III level. 
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Original Variables  Codified Variables 
Variable Nature  Variable  Categories  Nature 
POE Measure  Nominal  MEASPOE 
POE Measure 
1- 21 (Measure 2.1) 
2- 2.2 (Measure 2.2) 
3- 24 (Measure 2.4) 
4- 33 (Measure 3.3) 
5- 35 (Measure 3.5) 
6- 35;33 (Measure 3.5 and 3.3) 
7- 35;21 (Measure 3.5 and 2.1) 
8- 22;21 (Measure 2.2 and 2.1) 
Nominal 
POE Dimension  Nominal  DIMPOE 
POE Dimension 
1- AMB (Ambient) 
2- GPRAT (Good Practices) 
3- ECOM (Electronic Commerce) 
4- COOP (Co-operation) 
5- RCS (Regional Competitiveness Systems) 
6- ENERE (Energetic Efficiency)  
7- ENT (Entrepreneurship) 
8- H&S (Health & Safety) 
9- INOV (Innovation) 
10- INT (Internationalisation) 
11- MULTA (Multiareas) 
12- OBS (Observation) 
13- EXCP(Supply of Excellence Products) 
14- INDP (Industrial Property) 
15- HUMR (Human Resources) 
16- ISYST (Information Systems) 
17- IT (Information Technnologies) 
Nominal 
Investment Amount  Metric  INV 
Investment Amount 
1- INV1 (0€ ≤ INV < 1.000.000€) 
2- INV2 (1.000.000€ ≤ INV < 2.500.000€) 
3- INV3 (2.500.000€ ≤ INV < 5.000.000€) 
4- INV4 (INV ≥ 5.000.000€) 
Ordinal 
Subvention Amount  Metric  PSRATE 
Public Subvention Rate 
(Subvention / Investment) 
1- R1 (0% ≤ PSRATE < 50%) 
2- R2 (50% ≤ PSRATE < 70%) 
3- R3 (70% ≤ PSRATE < 90%) 
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  29 END NOTES 
                                                 
1 POE is the Portuguese Operational Programme for the Economy, included in the Third Community 
Framework Support, 2000-2006, funded by European Structural Funds. 
2 PEDIP 2: Strategic Program for the Modernisation and Improvement of Portuguese Industry. 
3 PEDIP 1: Specific Programme to the Development of Portuguese Industry. 
4 Data from the so-called “Base de Dados de Propostas de Ideias” (GPF/POE) and from the main 
information system of the programme, SiPOE/PRIME. 
5 Given that each eigenvalue is the arithmetic mean of the discriminating measure in each dimension, 
generally, it is purposed that it should be given a greater relevance to the variables with discriminating 
measure in each dimension at least equal to the respective eigenvalue (Carvalho, 1998). Following this 
reference, both dimensions discriminate significantly the type of projects and the number of partners. On 
the other hand, the sector of incidence and regional incidence variables have discriminate measures lower 
than any eigenvalue associated with each dimension. However, since this variables are crucial for the 
analysis of the pattern of PIP, manly concerning the type of decentralisation, we decided not to exclude 
them form the analysis. 
  30 